

## **Cyborg & Cyclops: the vision of a man-machine**

Susanna Paasonen

suspaa@utu.fi

Published in Tanja Sihvonen & Pasi Väliäho (eds.), *Experiencing the Media: Assemblages and Cross-Overs*. Media Studies, University of Turku, 2003, pp. 236–254.

ISBN 951-29-2562-1.

Since the early 1990s, cyborg, cybernetic organisms, has been given a central status in studies of the so-called “cyberculture” – new media, computer technology, information networks and digital culture – as well as in cultural theory at large. Half organic and half machine, cyborg has become a standard “boundary figure” through which the inter-connections and fusions of humans and technology, the experience of media and technological saturation are represented. Cyborg has been established as figure for post-humanism, the post-human and anti-human, dispersed and constructed identities, the reorganisation and renegotiation of binary divisions of nature and culture.

The question of man-machine and vision appears dual. On the one hand, it has to do with how cyborgs have been envisioned: the utterances and manifestos through which cyborgs have been formed and the agendas and the desires involved in this. On the other hand, it concerns things seen by a man-machine, the perceptions possible and available to cyborgs, and the vistas they enable for scholarly work. To untangle some of these questions, I focus on perhaps the most iconic text of cyborg research, Donna Haraway’s 1985 “A Manifesto for Cyborgs,” which some might argue has been quoted and discussed *ad nauseum*. The manifesto is characterised by Haraway as “an ironic political myth,”<sup>1</sup> and as its sub-title “Science, Technology, and Socialist-Feminism in the Late Twentieth Century” suggests, it has a firm focus on feminist theory and “the science question.” My interests lay centrally on how the manifesto has been read and defined, as well as the things that could be still learned from it.

Rather than celebrating “cyborg consciousness,” this article explores *the telling and symptomatic absences* in cyborg discourse, *centrally the effacement of materialism, feminist politics and race as themes central to the figuration of cyborg*, as outlined by Haraway. These silences and effacements appear in a wide range of cyborg commentaries from enthusiastic embrace of technological embodiment to their critique, and I find them telling of the status of feminist thinking in media studies and cultural theory. Reading Haraway’s cyborg manifesto and her work on situated knowledges, I address the context of the manifesto within feminist theorising, and argue for the necessity of acknowledging these debates as central to “cyborg visions” and cultural theory.

### **Cyborgs, coyotes and Cyclops**

In Haraway’s manifesto the cyborg, which tends to be discussed dominantly in the context of techno-science and contemporary media culture, was introduced as a theoretical figure for rethinking binary divisions and binary thinking. Such binaries and boundaries include gender as a dualist division into male and female, as well as into organic and inorganic, natural and artificial. Located on the boundary of human and machine, the cyborg is not inherently heterosexual, raced or gendered, but a model for feminist subjectivity, crossing and violating boundaries of sexuality, race or gender – as well as those separating human and technological: It is an alternative figuration for thinking about the possible relationship between women and technology, but also for conceptualising “woman” (both as subject and category) split by differences.

The 1985 manifesto is often conflated with 1990s theorising of women and the Internet, but this was not the context for its discussion of cybernetic technologies and their feminist appropriations. The manifesto outlined a feminist subject that would not repeat familiar effacement of lesbians or women of colour from the general category of “women” – one that would enable feminist theorising in a situation where this very category was being debated and re-thought. Furthermore, the manifesto argued for feminist appropriations of technology, and for women’s active participation in techno-scientific research. Whereas for feminists writing in a cultural feminist tradition, like Mary Daly, technology was seen as patriarchal and thus other to gynocentric practices, Haraway argued for a feminist incorporation and appropriation of technology, and answerability for its uses. Daly<sup>2</sup> saw boundary violations of the human and machine in technological visions as illustrations of patriarchal aggression towards women, but for Haraway they illustrated possibilities for change and multiplicity. The manifesto asks for a critical feminist embrace of technology instead of turning towards myths of origin, women’s shared experience, or “nature.” Thus, commenting on cultural-feminist texts that link women and nature as the other to male technology, Haraway famously declared that she “would rather be a cyborg than a goddess.”<sup>3</sup>

The manifesto argues against the notion of women’s shared experience and unity, central to the argumentation of the women’s liberation movement, and outlines feminism based on coalition and affinity rather than identity.<sup>4</sup> The cyborg is “a rhetorical strategy and a political method,” for rethinking hierarchical gender divisions, and for seeking alternatives for speaking about women – not through assumptions of shared experience or ways of being, but through affinities and alliances.<sup>5</sup> As Maria Fernández points out, “Haraway wrote the manifesto in response to endless fragmentation of the US Second Wave feminist movement along the lines of ethnic, racial and sexual identity. The manifesto called for the crossing of boundaries and for a re-organisation of women on the basis of affinities of political kinship.”<sup>6</sup> This particular discursive location of the manifesto is easily effaced in its later appropriations: when its strategic function in rethinking feminist agency, along with political edge, is ignored, one is left with a cyborg figure heavily and, as I see it, *symptomatically* truncated.

One major truncation in readings of the manifesto concerns feminist epistemology and situated knowledges – the possibilities of both feminist subjects and feminist objectivity, as discussed by Haraway. In her (another) influential and widely cited article, “Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective,” Haraway outlines a feminist epistemology that accounts for the specificity and situationality of knowledge production, yet refuses relativism as the necessary outcome. The article seeks alternatives to the traditional ideals and ideologies of scientific objectivity and neutrality that efface the specificity of the researcher’s location and builds a ravine between the researcher and his object. For Haraway, such an “infinite vision is an illusion, a god-trick,” while relativism is similarly “a way of being nowhere while claiming to be everywhere equally.” Contrary to such god-tricks of “seeing everything from nowhere,” she lays emphasis on vision as embodied and perspective as partial – for in order to see anything, one must first have a specific location.<sup>7</sup> Therefore, it becomes central to insist “metaphorically on the particularity and embodiment of all vision (though not necessarily organic embodiment and including technological mediation),” and not to give into “the tempting myths of vision as a route to disembodiment and second-birthing.”<sup>8</sup> For Haraway all knowledge is situated and partial in perspective, and universalising claims of speaking for everybody become understood as colonising gestures.

*Vision* is a key theme and metaphor in Haraway’s formulation of situated knowledges: knowing becomes understood as seeing and universalisation as both infinite vision and a biased perspective. According to Joost van Loon, insistence on situated knowledge makes visible “the self-centered, isomorphic, cyclopean I/Eye, the god trick, the view from nowhere.”<sup>9</sup> Countering omnipresent vision of the “cyclopean, self-satiated eye of the master subject,” Haraway develops critical

epistemology based on partial perspective. This involves *accountability* for the things one argues and the consequences that these acts may have, and self-reflexivity in terms of the possibilities and limits of one's perspective.<sup>10</sup>

The cyborg is the other of the Cyclops ("the master's eye, a travelling lens"). The Cyclops (a.k.a. the Cartesian subject) refuses to move or alter perspective: therefore both the subject and object of knowledge remain immobile and apparently fixed, and Cyclops' field of vision considerably two-dimensional. Cyclops claims to be invisible and to see all, but he is unable to see himself, engage in self-reflection, or to consider the limits and conditions of his own interpretations. As Mikko Lehtonen points out, the Cyclops freezes his object of study as a *statue* (fixed, unchanging).<sup>11</sup> Contrary to the idea of the object of study as fixed and knowable in its entity – the immobile, passive object as seen by the Cyclops –, Haraway introduces the Native American figure of a *Trickster or Coyote* to describe a view of the object of study (in her case, the nature) as a "witty agent." The Coyote "suggests our situation when we give up our mastery but keep searching for fidelity, knowing all the while we will be hoodwinked. [--] I like to see feminist theory as a reinvented coyote discourse obligated to its enabling sources in many kinds of heterogeneous accounts of the world."<sup>12</sup> The trickster is unpredictable and uncontrollable: it fools interpreters and gives way to multiple interpretations. Lehtonen suggests the nomad as the term for an alternative (anti-Cyclops, anti-monad) view of the subject, which in Haraway's vocabulary would be cyborg. Like cyborgs, nomads are committed to multiple perspectives and interpretations made of the object of study: they move around, blurring the boundaries of the knower and the known, search for new perspectives and hardly expect to uncover "the whole truth."<sup>13</sup>

### **White bodies, familiar horizons**

Feminist cyborg readings have posed inter-connections of women and computers, or online self-representations of women as signs of cyborg subjectivity.<sup>14</sup> Women maintaining their web camera sites, for example, have been read as "cyborgian" fusions of the human and the machine, and even as literal examples of the cyborg as hybrid fusions of human and machine "resolutely committed to partiality, irony, intimacy and perversity."<sup>15</sup> Such readings are marked by a certain syllogism: as signs of cyborg subjectivity are looked for in human-machine interaction, they are usually also found, given that cybernetics refers to communications and automatic control in machines and organic systems,<sup>16</sup> and cyborg figures are used to illustrate confluences of machines and organic systems.

Labelling computer usage as cybernetic or "cyborgian" works to efface differences in human-machine connections, since such readings tend not to differentiate between the privileged white "cyborg" women with web camera sites and self-declared nudist tendencies, or the "cyborg" women of colour working at *maquiladoras* manufacturing computers and web cameras that such acts require.<sup>17</sup> The cyborg, outlined as a figure for discussing differences among and between women, may work to render invisible differences in women's locations and the varying ways in which technology enables and conditions them. Such effacement and literal whitewashing is a move quite familiar from feminist theorising of former decades. Criticising Mary Daly's readings of the goddess in 1979, Audre Lorde pointed out women's radically different positions in relation of power, as well as the racism implicit in the tendency to efface women of colour from discussions concerning "us women."<sup>18</sup> Perhaps it is fitting for ironic cyborg politics, that Haraway's critique of cultural feminist celebrations of the goddess, manifesto for feminist affinity, recognition of hybridity and difference, becomes used as model for female agency undisturbed by issues of ethnicity or race.

Haraway discusses her cyborg figure centrally in terms of racial hierarchies and models cyborg on politics of partiality. The figure of cyborg as in-between draws from Chicana feminists writing, especially Chela Sandoval's work on oppositional consciousness, a political identity "born of the skills for reading webs of power by those refused stable membership in the social categories of race, sex, or class," and from Gloria Anzaldúa's *consciencia de la mestiza*, a breaking down and uprooting of dualistic thinking, a queer location at the borderlands.<sup>19</sup> Aída Hurtado argues that Chicana feminist reflections of boundaries, borders and female subjects involve "the ability to hold multiple social perspectives while simultaneously maintaining a core center, around which revolve concrete material oppressions."<sup>20</sup> Writing between national and ethnic boundaries, social movements and sexualities, Chicana feminists become a model for cyborg that is metaphorical, yet tied into materiality, to bodies in specific locations, under specific social, political and material conditions. As Chela Sandoval argues, "the body of the feminist cyborg becomes clearly articulated with the material and psychic positionings of U.S. third world feminism."<sup>21</sup> Appropriating the cyborg in return, Sandoval discusses it as a boundary figure that stands for displacements of unitary subject and disciplinary boundaries alike, for oppositional consciousness that characterises colonised peoples (of the Americas).<sup>22</sup> In this context, cyborg is connected to issues of labour, racism and feminist activism while still remaining a figuration for rethinking subjectivity and the category of the human.

While Haraway's cyborg is unfaithful to its origins (in the US military), and refuses origin stories, I find it another thing altogether *to overlook or ignore the theoretical and conceptual framework in which the figuration was articulated*. Haraway envisions change through figures marked and marginalised in terms of race, class and gender that point to alternative forms of conceptualising the self and the world, connections between humans, animals and machines. Chela Sandoval and Maria Fernández both point out how the issue of racism, central to Haraway's manifesto, is forgotten in the majority of cyberfeminist cyborg appropriations – not to even mention scholarly cyborg discourse at large.<sup>23</sup> The tendency to bypass the connections of the cyborg figuration to hierarchies of race can be read as attraction of disembodied abstraction, as simultaneous effacement of embodiment *and* ethnicity and race as issues that matter. As mentioned, this means whitewashing, for as race and racism disappear from (or are not even included on) the agenda, white people remain the transparent norm. Given that reflections on cyborgs and of race have been predominantly produced by people of colour,<sup>24</sup> it seems that views of whiteness as the unmarked, as if invisible position<sup>25</sup> are still active and influential.

This is not to say that Haraway's manifesto is void of problems concerning ethnicity, power and location itself. As Sanna Rojola points out, the manifesto has been critiqued of using women of colour as metaphorical figures and tools for doing theory, rather than as its subjects.<sup>26</sup> Haraway has since reformulated her claim that "we are (all) cyborgs," and reflected on it as an imperialising move and emphasised the differences in subject positions among and between women.<sup>27</sup> Nevertheless, the status of non-white women in the manifesto as romanticised figures remains problematic.

### **Working with figurations**

Haraway's texts are dense with metaphors and wordplay, and the status of her textual figures often appears unclear. The manifesto, ranging between as description of the current cultural situation, and a vision of possible futures, refuses simple readings and may therefore be a source of some frustration.<sup>28</sup> The manifesto does not enable sufficient differentiation between different subject positions and the material conditions of living that all become conflated under the title of cyborg – and certain confusion ensues.<sup>29</sup> Rethinking the manifesto, Haraway suggests a broader gallery or family of displaced figures to account for multiple displaced identities,<sup>30</sup> while Rosi Braidotti has

outlined the figure of a nomad and feminist thinking as nomadism: “As Haraway rightly puts it: you must be located somewhere in order to make statements of general value. Nomadism, therefore, is not fluidity without borders but rather an acute awareness of the nonfixity of boundaries.” Consequently, the nomad is “a cyborg, but equipped with an unconscious. [--] S/he is abstract and perfectly, operationally real.”<sup>31</sup>

The nomad, like the cyborg, Cyclops and coyote are all figurations, alternative tropes through which the stage is set for possible pasts and futures within feminist theorising.<sup>32</sup> For Haraway, figurations stand for “a politically informed account of an alternative subjectivity,” feminist forms of knowledge “that are not caught in a mimetic relationship to dominant scientific discourses.” Figurations are used in feminist theory for imagining forms of subjectivity and humanity that are neither literal nor fixed in repeating old master narratives or the Enlightenment figures of coherent and masterful subjectivity.<sup>33</sup> Figurations, Braidotti argues, are not mere metaphors, but attempts to “draw a cartography of the power-relations that define (our) respective positions. They don’t embellish or metaphorize: they just express different socio-economic and symbolic locations.”<sup>34</sup>

Cyborg visions help to consider the norms and conventions in understanding the “category of human.” As Diane Fuss explains, the human as a “linguistic, cultural and social construct” that functions as a metaphysical predicate to “man,” can only be traced to early eighteenth century. A relatively recent concept, the human has both been based on, and used for the exclusion of the “less-human” – women, slaves, immigrants, children, the poor – as well as the non-human – animals and machines.<sup>35</sup> In Fuss’ terms, anti-humanist approach interrogates “*the process by which the human comes to mean* in the production of cultural difference:” since the category of the human is fundamentally defined by and structured on exclusions, a focus on the confusions at the boundaries of the human makes it possible to consider the norms, rules and ideologies upon which these exclusions are based.<sup>36</sup> This, again, gives rise to a different kind of understanding of what it means to occupy, or to be occupied by, the category of a culturally intelligible subject.

As Judith Halberstam and Ira Livingston argue, “the human functions to domesticate and hierarchize difference within the human (whether according to race, class, gender) and to absolutize difference between the human and the nonhuman,” whereas an anti-humanist approach “does not reduce difference-from-others to difference-from-self, but rather emerges in the pattern of resonance and interference between the two.”<sup>37</sup> Anti-humanist stance takes into consideration the random and shifting boundaries and relations between the human and the non-human, (wo)man, machine and animal. Figurations like cyborgs are tools for thinking through these connections and differences in theory-formation: they necessitate understanding differences as other than pejorative, and the notion of “difference” as in itself split and multiple. For, as Rosi Braidotti warns, “the first and the foremost link between women, racialized, ethnic or technological others and monsters lies in the eyes of the Master colonizer. Only in His gaze are their respective differences flattened out in a general category of ‘difference’ whose pejorative status is structural to the establishment of a norm that is inevitably masculine, white, heterosexual.”<sup>38</sup>

## Body-machines

While *anti-humanist*, the cyborg figuration is not necessarily *anti-human* in the sense of being synonymous with posthuman visions that see artificial intelligence rendering the human (“the flesh”) redundant. However, given that anti-humanist critique is widely discussed as posthuman and transhuman, differences between these concepts are hardly clearly drawn.<sup>39</sup> N. Katherine Hayles, for example, uses the term posthuman to discuss the emphasis on information over the material, definitions of consciousness as an epiphenomenon, and the body as prosthesis. For Hayles, “the posthuman view configures human being so that it can be seamlessly articulated with intelligent

machines,” but the posthuman also signifies the critique of the autonomous, rational subject, and attempts to rethink the category of the human.<sup>40</sup> Such a general view of the posthuman enables an analysis of a wide discursive field for rethinking and displacing the humanist subject. Nevertheless, one should not ignore the fundamental differences between the two approaches (“anti-human” depictions of the human exclusively in machine terms and “anti-humanist” critique), not only for conceptual clarity, but also for the belief that the category of the human remains strategically central for feminist theory.<sup>41</sup> Critique of the category of the human does not necessitate abandoning the term, but rather a renegotiation and bending of its conventional meanings.<sup>42</sup>

Teresa de Lauretis sees feminism as an important field of anti-humanist investigation due to the “epistemological priority which feminism has located in the personal, the subjective, the body, [--] the quotidian, as the very site of material inscription of the ideological.” Feminist critique differs from philosophical anti-humanism in its emphasis on embodiment, representation and politics<sup>43</sup> – issues that do tend to disappear in abstract investigations into human and machine relations. While this specificity is present in the cyborg manifesto, it appears easily lost in its later appropriations.

Both scientific and popular investigations into cybernetics have tended to regard the body as a system of feedback loops and autonomous responses – less as a material object than an informational pattern, the operations of which can be explained and modelled, often through machine analogies.<sup>44</sup> Although cybernetics has contributed to the critique of the autonomous, liberal subject, its rationalised articulations of body-machines also build on a Cartesian paradigm that separates body (as matter, as object) from the realm of reason and knowledge, that of the rational mind.<sup>45</sup> Feminist theory, again, has, since the 1970s, called for a politics of location in an attempt to map anti-Cartesian forms of reason and embodiment. Radical feminist poet and theorist Adrienne Rich posed the question in 1976: “cannot (women) begin, at least, to *think through the body*, to connect what has been so cruelly disorganized.”<sup>46</sup> Radical feminism articulated body and sexuality as terrain of power and knowledge, thus breaking the transparency of the “natural body” – even if this work is occasionally seen as celebrations of an “innocent, natural organic past,” the human body as “the sacred icon of the essential.”<sup>47</sup>

Bringing these two paradigms together, Haraway argued for feminist appropriation of technology, for hijacking cyborg from its economic and political birth conditions and for using to envision possible futures. Doing this, Haraway discusses Adrienne Rich’s, Audre Lorde’s and Susan Griffin’s insistence on the organic as opposed to the technological, and defines them “in Sandoval’s terms as oppositional ideologies fitting in the late twentieth century” that is preoccupied with machines and techno-science. In this sense, “they are part of the cyborg world.”<sup>48</sup>

Nevertheless one should also ask to what degree are cyborgs open to feminist appropriations, and can they be uprooted from their military and techno-scientific contexts? Writing on the importance of science fiction for U.S. culture, Sharona Ben-Tov poses the question, arguing that the wide appeal of Haraway’s figuration owes to the lure of a cultural fantasy that “the world really lends itself to complete definition and control by science and technology.”<sup>49</sup> In Ben-Tov’s reading, the cyborg manifesto does not have the rhetorical power to subvert the ideology on which it is built and which reiterates Cartesian views of embodiment. She argues that, “Haraway’s image of the skin is a passive shell between the Cartesian self and the object world. Cyborg embodiment means installing devices in the shell, augmenting it with machines that ‘can be prosthetic devices, intimate components, friendly selves.’” However, “[m]achines don’t blur the boundary of the self; they just extend it.”<sup>50</sup> According to Ben-Tov, Haraway ends up repeating the liberatory rhetoric of science fiction and technological utopianism that she claims to confront. In this reading, cyborgs are optical illusions: claiming to collapse binaries, they work to reinforce them.

Although Sharona Ben-Tov can be criticised for being literal and not giving full credit to the manifesto's strategic nature in negotiating common ground for articulations of a feminist subject, it is important to note that the cyberdiscourse that Haraway employs has effects that feminist appropriations may not be able to subvert. Similarly, Anne Balsamo, dubious of the subversive potential of feminist cyborg figurations, argues that Haraway “fails to consider how the cyborg has already been fashioned in our cultural imagination” and how it may resist feminist re-imagining and even work against a feminist agenda.<sup>51</sup> Cyborg figures base on the view of the body as a rationalised cybernetic system that can be rebuilt so as to liberate people from the confines of their embodiment. Once the body becomes constructed in terms of mechanical logic, it becomes difficult to turn this logic around when outlining human-machine connections.

### **The vistas at hand**

In her model of nomadic thinking, Rosi Braidotti draws from Haraway and radical feminist thinking alike and calls for *radical immanence*, a way of thinking “through the body, not in a flight away from it.”<sup>52</sup> Radical immanence goes against the god-tricks of transcendence and escape from the body, of Master’s eyes and views from nowhere. Radical immanence and nomadic thinking include a radical redefinition of embodiment, sensuality and difference: both Haraway and Braidotti define metaphysics as a political ontology, and make way for feminist epistemology.<sup>53</sup>

Following Luce Irigaray, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Braidotti discusses becomings (“becoming women/animal/insect/machine”) as a model thinking of subjects as mobile and transitory, and for nomadic thinking as “a tendency, a predisposition which expresses the outward-bound nature of the subject.”<sup>54</sup> In her broad reading of confusion over the boundaries of the categories of women, animals, insects and machines, Braidotti argues for the necessity to rethink the human, to coin alternative figurations and to reconfigure difference as positive (rather than negative or pejorative) – to “illuminate the thresholds of ‘otherness’ while displacing their boundaries.”<sup>55</sup>

Writing with Deleuzian rhetoric of becomings and intensities in places not dissimilar to Braidotti’s, Jukka Sihvonen in his recent books outlined the “plugging in” of human to machine (or, machine to human) through investigations into the history of media technology, cinema, virtual reality experiments and the framework of modern urban consumer culture.<sup>56</sup> The books are titled introductions to future media culture and the logic of connectedness, and they consist of readings of media technological innovations, cinematic texts, modes of perception and experience, fantasies and visions of technology. Through these, Sihvonen maps the creation of “machine flesh,” subjection of sensuality to the logic of spectacle and mechanics. The narrative is both pessimistic (machine flesh is posed as the logical, even unavoidable outcome of cultural developments) and enthusiastic in its attention to details, anecdotes, analogues and inter-connections that have contributed to its emergence.

Machine flesh can be seen as a figuration for the collapse at the boundaries of the human, for living and thinking in a technological culture. Like Braidotti, Sihvonen addresses the intimacy of machines and flesh, and aims to understand the implications that transformations in ways of seeing, living and making sense of the world through technology have for the culture at large. In this sense, his work is connected to the thinking of both Haraway and Braidotti. Yet they are also marked apart by a significant gap, which brings me to the point of things to be learned from feminist theory and the cyborg manifesto.

In spite of the rhetoric of corporeality and materiality (“machine flesh” and “immaterial laps”), Sihvonen addresses first and foremost the field of vision – visual media technologies and the

dominance of sight. Machine flesh stands for “*a collage of the object of study, way of looking and viewership that is undergoing perpetual transformation.*”<sup>57</sup> Thus the eye becomes the key organ and synonym for cognition and the senses at large, while the body and sensuality become abstracted.<sup>58</sup> Given the emphasis on the visual, cinema takes the frontal stage as example of the modes of perception, and the plugging-in of human and machine. Other central media technologies (or vision machines) discussed by Sihvonen include the telescope, the camera, and immersive VR technologies. Of these, the Hubble telescope becomes the figure for contemporary modes of seeing: the global proliferation of media discourses and technologies that defines life on the planet: “From this perspective, it is unnecessary babble to moan about the *only* five percent of ‘privileged’ with the tools, possibilities and wealth to make use of modern high technology. In the ‘eyes’ of the Hubble telescope, a Tutsi escaping from Ruanda, who hardly even owns his own name, and Bill Gates are not different in any way in this respect: for both are on the surface of the orb, the connections to which to the surrounding space the telescope constructs.”<sup>59</sup>

This formulation connects humans, machines and modes of seeing in one model, characterised by the aim of the technological vision machine to see and know everything.<sup>60</sup> If the cyborg manifesto does not enable a clear differentiation “between the privileged five percent” of people consuming products of high technology, and those lacking access to consumer electronics or even electricity, then Sihvonen’s articulation of human-machine interconnections refuses such differentiations as futile and besides the point before they are even voiced. In this sense, seeing “through the eyes of Hubble” is a god-trick in its classic form: all the people of the world are seen and connected both to each other and the skies above, abstracted from their socio-cultural locations and stylised into dots on an orb. The researcher takes the place of Hubble, claiming access to unlimited vision through the disembodied eye of Cyclops.

Sihvonen’s overviews of “plugging in” address debates over the lived body versus the modern (Cartesian) view of body as automaton or corpse, attempts to detach vision from embodiment and to leave the body behind with the aid of technological prosthesis, and he argues for the centrality of embodiment and even materiality in theories of vision and technology. Nevertheless, Sihvonen also makes way for the “eye” as abstraction and disembodied view from nowhere, to bodies as machines or surfaces open for recoding. Like the cyborg manifesto, his writings are occasionally a confusing read, and their confusion derives from the lack of definitions and situating. Unlike the manifesto, the narrative of “plugging in” addresses debates without grounding itself in any particular perspective, and glides from connection, vision, intensity and analogue to another, explaining one stance and then another, but seldom arguing for one over the other. This can be read as a situation where the object of study (theories and histories of media technology) is a “coyote” or “trickster” that is always plural and on the move and that necessitates equally mobile forms of interpretation. Nevertheless, it remains debatable to which degree could Hubble ever serve as a cyborg or nomad.

The tendency of broad narratives of technology and culture to be “views from nowhere” that nevertheless – or perhaps therefore – claim to “see all,” is hardly particular to Sihvonen, but even characteristic to theories of technoculture.<sup>61</sup> Not confined by particular locations of writing, although perhaps to a degree by accountability, broad (and often metaphorical) readings of “technologisation” or “digitisation” describe the general state of affairs, but also claim to provide visions of the future. A prophetic tone is certainly present in the cyborg manifesto, but tied to the tradition of utopian thinking, ironic appropriation of the history of socialism, and the creation of a socialist-feminist agenda, and strategic in its attempts to open ground for feminist appropriations of science and technology. The manifesto foregrounds materiality and subjectivity, and works to bridge the division between metaphor and physical reality, without rendering materiality into a mere figure of speech. As a strategic construction, the cyborg both points to conventional binaries and fixed categories and helps to set such binaries into motion, indicates their construed nature and enables new kinds of articulations – seeing how history (the current moment and future alike) “can

have another shape, articulated through differences that matter.”<sup>62</sup>

### Ways of reading and writing

While broad narratives on technology and cyborgisation address developments and tendencies that have led to the current cultural moment, it often remains vague which culture, which people, which bodies and which technologies are being discussed. Both technology and embodiment become used as metaphors, often rephrased through figures of “machine” and “flesh,” and thus abstracted. Consequently, “machine” can be anything from Jacquard loom to Bluetooth, and “flesh” may be anything from the metallic intestines of automata to ageing bodies with pacers, or porn models parading on computer and television screens.<sup>63</sup> However, rarely is such flesh lived and experienced, or understood in the sense of “radical immanence” that Braidotti discusses. As Vivian Sobchack points out, the abstraction of the body (a staple feature in cyberdiscourse) sets it apart from the senses. Pain and pleasure alike become amputated, yet metaphorical, and bodies become seen as fetishized objects (bodies we have) rather than lived (bodies that we are).<sup>64</sup> Arguing against this logic of decontextualising “our flesh into insensate sign” or digitising it “into cyberspace,” Sobchack reminds her readers of the need to recognise bodily sensations and their specific locations as things that matter.<sup>65</sup>

In cinematic fictions, man-machines have represented dehumanisation, monstrosity and destruction (as famously with Dr. Who’s cybermen, or the first Terminator film). In addition to their metallic attire, cyborgs have been known from their machine voices and the lack of bodily pain. In fact, their dominant sense has been vision – be that infrared, zoom or night vision. Contrary to feminist articulations of embodied knowledge, or “thinking through the body,” cyborgs, with their sensors, repeat the logic of an automaton, which Dalia Judovitz sees as characteristic of modern views of embodiment.<sup>66</sup> In fact, it appears that cyborgs, as fashioned in diverse cultural texts, represent the logic of the Cyclops, rather than the nomad.

Obviously, the cyborg never has a fixed meaning: as Rosi Braidotti points out, “a subject position like the cyborg simultaneously evokes an abstract image, or spectral commodification (Schwarzenegger) and a very embodied, concrete, and actualized one, namely the most anonymous, under-paid bodies of labourers – mostly ethnic, natives or immigrant – who fuel the technological revolution.”<sup>67</sup> Cyborg can be read as a metaphor for human-machine relations and hybrid subjectivity, but equally be used to articulate fantasies of control, technological progress and mastery that have little connection to a anti-racist, anti-classist or anti-(hetero)sexist agenda, as articulated in the manifesto. It seems a staple feature of cyborg discourse that political investments and specific references (to Chicana feminism in particular) are effaced, while slogans, such as “rather cyborg than a goddess,” gain considerable longevity.

Formulated in 1985, the cyborg was integrated into 1990s proliferating cyberdiscourse as a general metaphor for human-machine interconnections and fusions. In this paradigm of writing, references to feminist epistemology and socialist feminism were mostly cut out. As the cyborg was thus “cut free” from its strategic framework, it became to stand for the familiar conflation of freedom with immateriality and disembodiment that can be achieved through technology. While Haraway’s cyborg – hybrid, sensual and committed to partial perspective – appears separate from such (neo?)Cartesian reiterations, its readings are often colour-blind, lacking in stereovision and considerations for materialism.

Understood in the tradition feminist utopian thinking, the cyborg is a partial vision that can “provide a sufficiently open space into which to project the possibility of as yet unchartable change.”<sup>68</sup> Yet the figuration unavoidably fails, if read literally rather than figuratively: as a fantasy of overcoming

the body through the use of technology, as a science fiction fantasy of humanity made machine that enables endless gender switching and re-making of the self.<sup>69</sup> This has led commentators to collapse Haraway's manifesto with technofetishism, as fiction made into theory that makes no difference between the human and the machine, and celebrates the death of the organic.

In one such reading, Hannu Eerikäinen sees the cyborg manifesto as "belief in the resurrection of the body in a technological thereafter," as theory turned into metaphor and fantasy that is detached from lived bodies – generally, as bad theory and sloppy thinking.<sup>70</sup> Such willing – and often arrogant – misreadings pay little attention to the contexts of individual texts, and also work to downplay and render invisible their political agendas. Feminist epistemology is absent from Eerikäinen's reading, as are materialism and power as discussed by Haraway. Downplaying the political is common in commentaries of the cyborg manifesto which then becomes detached from socialist feminism, anti-racism and anti-(hetero)sexism, as well as from formulations of feminist objectivity based on partial perspectives and situated knowledges. I find it crucial to ask what understanding of the manifesto (or understandings of what) such readings produce.

Totalising readings of cyborg discourse work to reproduce yet another (Cyclops) view from nowhere, where texts are put "into place" without considering the places and locations in which they have been produced – and, one might claim, therefore they become misplaced. In Cyclops readings, the object is assumed as fixed and knowable statue, and can only have one set of meanings. These meanings the Cyclops, from his privileged position, is able to decode and make knowable. Arguments for feminist objectivity can be bypassed by the Cyclops as relativism or failed objectivity, while the framework of feminist theorising and the reworking of categories through which us and them are put into place appear irrelevant.

### **Lessons to be learned**

What then, is there for media studies to learn from the cyborg manifesto, and Haraway's project of situated knowledges at large? Perhaps most obviously, the manifesto reminds of the need to *rethink gender and the uses of nature in fixing gender as a binary structure*, rather than to take gender as something given, natural or binary. The cyborg, articulated almost two decades ago, envisions a utopian world of post-gender where binary models have lost their status and grip, but hardly suggests that such a state can be achieved merely through digitisation or the implantation of cyborg prosthesis, let alone increasing use of the Internet. This leads to a second lesson to be learned, namely the centrality of *partial perspective and accountability for the text one produces*. Studies of new media, media technology and (post)modern culture tend to be characterised by sweeping narratives of transformation and crisis that claim to see everything, but are themselves seldom situated. Discussions of "the body" becoming cyborg, again, are easily detached from the specificity of bodies, as marked by age, disability, gender or race.

Perhaps most centrally, the question concerns critical dialogue and engagement with bodies of theory – for while feminist theory is characterised by self-reflexivity and engagement in debates in contemporary cultural theory, scholars from outside the field seem far less eager to engage in a dialogue with feminist theory. As women's studies is finally establishing itself in Nordic academic institutions, it is continuously marked out as an island of its own by scholars not identifying with feminism or women's studies. It is rare for feminist theory to be acknowledged as "general" cultural theory, and it is equally rare for scholars doing "general" cultural theory to engage in discussions of feminist theory, or even to acknowledge this body of theory except for a few canonised scholars. Superficial knowledge of feminist theory is rarely considered a major fault in researchers and feminist studies rarely seen as elementary parts of curricula as other than special courses. Dismissing feminist theorising as "speciality area" reproduces the marginalisation of feminist

thinking, as well as reproducing the assumption that issues to do with gender and power are somehow not of general interest or pertinence.<sup>71</sup> Against this background of non-communication, the readings of cyborg manifesto where politics and the context of feminist theory are effaced are hardly surprising, but nevertheless disturbing.

Ultimately, the “lesson to be learned” from the cyborg manifesto and its academic “afterlife” concerns breaking down and rethinking not only of the boundaries of the organic and the mechanic, human and machine, to which countless of publications have already been dedicated, but more centrally of *breaking down and rethinking disciplinary boundaries, re-thinking the ways in which questions become marked as “general” and ones “of special interest,” and addressing the issues of power involved in this*. This unfinished business with making use of feminist theory as a *resource* rather than an “other” of some kind, helps to build a vacuum around women’s studies, and to keep hierarchies of canon and “core theory” at place. It makes it possible to bypass both feminist critiques of canonised theories and articulations of alternative epistemologies. The question is both political and ethical, but, I hope, also open.

---

<sup>1</sup> Donna Haraway, *Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature*. London: Free Association Books 1991, 149.

<sup>2</sup> Mary Daly, *Gyn/Ecology: The Metaethics of Radical Feminism*. Boston: Beacon Press 1978/1990.

<sup>3</sup> Haraway, *Simians, Cyborgs and Women*, 181.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, 155, 159.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, 149, 181.

<sup>6</sup> Maria Fernández, “The Cyborg (sweet sixteen and never been cloned),” 2001. Posted on OldBoys mailing list, accessed 23.8.2001, published in *Mute* issue 20, 2001.

<sup>7</sup> Haraway, *Simians, Cyborgs and Women*, 188–191; Sanna Rojola, ”Donna Haraway – Mieluummin kyborgi kuin jumalatar”. Teoksessa Anneli Anttonen, Kirsti Lempiäinen ja Marianne Liljeström (toim.), *Feministejä – Aikamme ajattelijoita*. Tampere: Vastapaino 2000, 153.

<sup>8</sup> Haraway, *Simians, Cyborgs and Women*, 189.

<sup>9</sup> Joost van Loon, “Technological Sensibilities and the Cyberpolitics of Gender: Donna Haraway’s Postmodern Feminism”. In *Innovation: The European Journal of Social Sciences*, Vol. 9, Issue 2, 1996, emphasis added.

<sup>10</sup> Haraway, *Simians, Cyborgs and Women*, 192

<sup>11</sup> Mikko Lehtonen, *Kyklooppi ja kojootti: Subjekti 1600–1900 -lukujen kulttuuri- ja kirjallisuusteorioissa*. Tampere: Vastapaino 1994, 259.

<sup>12</sup> Haraway, *Simians, Cyborgs and Women*, 199; also Donna Haraway, *The Actor Are Cyborg, Nature is Coyote, and the Geography is Elsewhere: Postscript to ‘Cyborgs at Large’*. In Constance Penley and Andrew Ross (eds.), *Technoculture*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1991/1992, 21–22.

<sup>13</sup> Lehtonen, *Kyklooppi ja kojootti*, 260–264.

<sup>14</sup> Krissi M. Jimroglou, “A Camera with a View: JenniCAM, Visual Representation and Cyborg Subjectivity”. In Eileen Green and Alison Adam (eds.), *Virtual Gender: Technology, Consumption and Identity*. London: Routledge 2001, 286–301; Kate O’Riordan, “Female Cyberbodies: Imaging on the Web”. Presentation at the Internet Research 1.0: The State of the Interdiscipline, The First Conference of the Association of Internet Researchers, September 14–17, 2000, University of Kansas; cf. Jeffrey A. Ow, “The Revenge of the Yellowface Cyborg: The Rape of Digital Geishas and the Colonization of Cyber-Coolies in 3D Realms’ Shadow Warrior”. In Beth E. Kolko, Lisa Nakamura and Gilbert B. Rodman (eds.), *Race in Cyberspace*. New York: Routledge 2000, 66–67, n1.

<sup>15</sup> Jimroglou, “A Camera with a View,” 288; cf. Haraway, *Simians, Cyborgs and Women*, 151.

<sup>16</sup> See Norbert Wiener, *Cybernetics: or Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine*. Second edition. Cambridge: MIT Press 1948/1999, 11–12.

<sup>17</sup> Coco Fusco, “At Your Service: Latinas in the Global Information Network.” Keynote Presentation at the Isea’98 Symposium, John Moores University, 1998. <http://www.hkw.de/forum/forum1/doc/text/fusco-isea98.html>; Melissa Wright, “Maquiladora Mestizas and a Feminist Border Politics: Revisiting Anzaldúa.” In Uma Narayan and Sandra Harding (eds.), *Decentering the Center: Philosophy for a Multicultural, Postcolonial, and Feminist World*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press 2000, 208–225.

<sup>18</sup> Audre Lorde, “An Open Letter to Mary Daly.” In Cherríe Moraga and Gloria Anzaldúa (eds.), *This Bridge Called My Back: Writings by Radical Women of Color*. Watertown: Persephone Press 1981, 94–97

<sup>19</sup> Sandoval cited in Haraway, *Simians, Cyborgs and Women*, 155–157; Gloria Anzaldúa, *Borderlands / La Frontera*. Second Edition. San Francisco: Aunt Lute Books 1987/1999, 99–102.

- <sup>20</sup> Aída Hurtado, “*Sitios y Lenguas: Chicanas Theorize Feminisms*”. In Uma Narayan and Sandra Harding (eds.), *Decentering the Center: Philosophy for a Multicultural, Postcolonial, and Feminist World*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press 2000, 128–155.
- <sup>21</sup> Chela Sandoval, “New Sciences: Cyborg Feminism and the Methodology of the Oppressed”. In Chris Hables Gray (ed.), *The Cyborg Handbook*. New York: Routledge 1995, 412.
- <sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, 408.
- <sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, 409. Fernández “The Cyborg”.
- <sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*; Chela Sandoval, *Methodology of the Oppressed*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 2000; Ow, “The Revenge of the Yellowface Cyborg”; Jennifer Gonzáles, “Envisioning Cyborg Bodies: Notes from Current Research”. In Chris Hables Gray (ed.), *The Cyborg Handbook*. New York: Routledge 1995, 267–279; Joseba Gabilondo, “Postcolonial Cyborgs: Subjectivity in the Age of Cybematic Reproduction”. In Chris Hables Gray (ed.), *The Cyborg Handbook*. New York: Routledge 1995, 423–432.
- <sup>25</sup> Richard Dyer, *White*. London: Routledge 1997.
- <sup>26</sup> Rojola, “Donna Haraway,” 150.
- <sup>27</sup> Haraway, *Simians, Cyborgs and Women*,” 150; Constance Penley and Andrew Ross, “Cyborgs at Large: Interview with Donna Haraway”. In Constance Penley and Andrew Ross (eds.), *Technoculture*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1991/1992, 12–13.
- <sup>28</sup> Rojola, “Donna Haraway,” 150–151.
- <sup>29</sup> See Penley and Ross, “Cyborgs at Large”, 12–14; and Sandoval, “New Sciences”.
- <sup>30</sup> Penley and Ross, “Cyborgs at Large,” 13; the family of figures has been developed in Haraway’s later work, such as *Modest\_Witness@Second\_Millennium. FemaleMan©\_Meets\_Oncomouse™: Feminism and Technoscience*. New York: Routledge 1997.
- <sup>31</sup> Rosi Braidotti, *Nomadic Subjects: Embodiment and Sexual Difference in Contemporary Feminist Thought*. New York: Columbia University Press 1994, 36, also 138–139. Cyborg and the subconscious are discussed in Penley and Ross, “Cyborgs at Large,” 8–12.
- <sup>32</sup> Donna Haraway, “Ecce Homo, Ain’t (Ar’n’t) I a Woman, and Inappropriate/d Others: The Human in a Post-Humanist Landscape”. In Judith Butler and Joan W. Scott (eds.), *Feminist Theorize the Political*. New York: Routledge 1992, 86.
- <sup>33</sup> *Ibid.* 87; Braidotti, *Nomadic Subjects*, 1, 75; Sarah Kember, “Feminist Figuration and the Question of Origin”. In George Robertson, Melinda Mash, Lisa Tickner, Jon Bird, Barry Curtis and Tim Putnam (eds.), *FutureNatural: Nature, Science, Culture*. London: Routledge 1996, 256, 264–265..
- <sup>34</sup> Rosi Braidotti, *Metamorphoses: Towards a Materialist Theory of Becoming*. Cambridge: Polity 2002, 3.
- <sup>35</sup> Diane Fuss, “Introduction: Human, All Too Human” In Diane Fuss (ed.), *Human, All Too Human*. New York: Routledge 1996, 1–4.
- <sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*; Cora Kaplan, “Afterword: Liberalism, Feminism, and Defect”. In Helen Deutsch and Felicity Nussbaum (eds.), “Defects”: *Engendering the Modern Body*. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press 2000, 303–307.
- <sup>37</sup> Judith Halberstam and Ira Livingston, “Introduction: Posthuman Bodies”. In Judith Halberstam and Ira Livingston (eds.), *Posthuman Bodies*. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press 1997, 10. Halberstam and Livingston, like Braidotti, use the term posthuman, but in the sense of anti-humanism rather than anti-human delation of materiality.
- <sup>38</sup> Braidotti, *Metamorphoses*, 197.
- <sup>39</sup> Halberstam and Livingston, “Introduction: Posthuman Bodies,” 1–19; Keith Ansell Pearson, *Viroid Life: Perspectives on Nietzsche and the Transhuman Condition*. London: Routledge 1997; Braidotti, *Metamorphoses*.
- <sup>40</sup> N. Katherine Hayles, *How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature, and Informatics*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1999, 2–3.
- <sup>41</sup> Haraway, “Ecce Homo,” 88; Haraway, “The Actors are Cyborg,” 25.
- <sup>42</sup> Cf. Judith Butler’s discussion on universalism: Judith Butler, “Dynamic Conclusions”. In Judith Butler, Ernesto Laclau and Slavoj Žizek, *Contingency, Hegemony, Universality*. New York: Verso 2000, 264; also Judith Butler, “Restaging the Universal: Hegemony and the Limits of Formalism”. In Judith Butler, Ernesto Laclau and Slavoj Žizek, *Contingency, Hegemony, Universality*. New York: Verso 2000, 39–40.
- <sup>43</sup> Teresa de Lauretis, “Feminist Studies/Critical Studies: Issues, Terms, and Contexts”. In Teresa de Lauretis (ed.), *Feminist Studies/Critical Studies 1986/1994*. Houndmills: MacMillan, 11–12.
- <sup>44</sup> Hayles, *How We Became Posthuman*, 100.
- <sup>45</sup> Dalia Judovitz, *Dalia, The Culture of the Body: Genealogies of Modernity* Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press 1999, 133–135.
- <sup>46</sup> Adrienne Rich, *Of Woman Born: Motherhood as Experience and Institution*. New York: Norton 1976/1995, 284.
- <sup>47</sup> Judith Squires, “Fabulous Feminist Futures and the Lure of Cyberculture” (1996). In David Bell and Barbara M. Kennedy (eds.), *The Cybercultures Reader*. London: Routledge 2000, 367–368.
- <sup>48</sup> Haraway, *Simians, Cyborgs, and Women*, 174.
- <sup>49</sup> Sharona Ben-Tov, *The Artificial Paradise: Science Fiction and American Reality*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press 1995, 143.
- <sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, 144–146.

- <sup>51</sup> Anne Balsamo, "Reading Cyborgs Writing Feminism" (1988). In Gill Kirkup, Linda Janes, Kathryn Woodward and Fiona Hovenden (eds.), *The Gendered Cyborg: A Reader*. London: Routledge and Open University 2000, 155–156.
- <sup>52</sup> Braidotti, *Metamorphoses*, 5.
- <sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, 200, 240–241.
- <sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, 70.
- <sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*, 202.
- <sup>56</sup> Jukka Sihvonen, *Aineeton syli: johdatus audiovisuaaliseen tulevaisuuteen*. Helsinki: Gaudeamus 1996; Jukka Sihvonen, *Konelihan värinä: johdatus kytkeytymisen maailmankuvaan*. Helsinki: Like 2001.
- <sup>57</sup> Sihvonen, *Konelihan värinä*, 41, emphasis added.
- <sup>58</sup> For a discussion of vision, knowledge, power and disembodiment, see Haraway, *Simians, Cyborgs, and Women*, 188–196; also Braidotti, *Metamorphoses*, 246.
- <sup>59</sup> Sihvonen, *Konelihan värinä*, 199–200.
- <sup>60</sup> Cf. Sihvonen, *Aineeton syli*, 9.
- <sup>61</sup> See, for example Friedrich Kittler, *Gramophone, film, Typewriter*. Stanford: Stanford University Press 1999; or, in another context, Sadie Plant, *Zeros + Ones: Digital Women and the New Technoculture*. London: Fourth Estate 1997.
- <sup>62</sup> Haraway, "Ecce Homo," 98.
- <sup>63</sup> This tendency has been evident for example in Nordic seminars with cinema studies scholars discussing new media, such as the 2000 "Image, body and technology" workshop, University of Copenhagen, and the 2001 "Wavelengths of the Arts: Storage Media, Discourse Networks and Aesthetic Representation" seminar, NTNU.
- <sup>64</sup> Vivian Sobchack, *Beating the Meat/Surviving the Text, or How to Get out of This Century Alive*. In Mike Featherstone and Roger Burrows (eds.), *Cyberspace / Cyberbodies / Cyberpunk: Cultures of Technological Embodiment*. London: Sage 1995, 211.
- <sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*, 209; also Braidotti, *Metamorphoses*, 224. Fantasies of transcending and rebuilding the body easily override feminist concerns for anti-Cartesian reasoning and body politics also within cyberfeminism: see Alison Adam, "What Should We Do with Cyberfeminism?" In Rachel Lander and Alison Adam (eds.), *Women in Computing*. Exeter: Intellect Books 1997, 20–21
- <sup>66</sup> Judovitz, *The Culture of the Body*, 170.
- <sup>67</sup> Braidotti, *Metamorphoses*, 189.
- <sup>68</sup> Angelika Bammer, *Partial Visions: Feminism and Utopianism in the 1970s*. London: Routledge 1991, 4, 155.
- <sup>69</sup> Alkeline van Lenning, "Utopian Bodies and Their Shadows". In Alkeline van Lenning, Marrie Bekker and Ine Vanwesenbeeck (eds.), *Feminist Utopias in a Postmodern Era*. Tilburg: Tilburg University Press 1997, 138–139; Renate Klein, "If I'm a Cyborg rather than a Goddess will Patriarchy Go Away?" In Renate Klein and Susan Hawthorne (eds.), *CyberFeminism: Connectivity, Critique and Creativity*. Melbourne: Spinifex 1999, 202, 208.
- <sup>70</sup> Hannu Eerikäinen, "Elämää laboratoriossa: tieteiskuvitelma teorialafiktioihin Ruumiin, koneen ja halun metamorfoosi post-teoriassa". *Lähikuva* 2/2000, 60–65.
- <sup>71</sup> Similarly, issues to do with race can be handily marked as particular to postcolonial or ethnic studies, and issues of heteronormativity and sexuality as those specific to queer theory – and therefore as "of not our concern".